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Recently it has been stated that the "provocation doctrine is odd and in a state of chaos."
1 
This comment represents the views of many academics at this time who remain frustrated 
with the doctrine's many contradictions and uncertain rationale. Much of this uncertainty 
arises over whether the defence is to be properly categorised as a justification or as an 
excuse. This essay will therefore begin by examining what the provocation defence 
would look like under either of these two theoretical heads of liability. By exploring the 
history of the doctrine, it will then be emphasised that while the doctrine initially 
resembled aspects of justification, recent case law has revealed a move primarily to the 
basis of excuse. The result of this move has meant a widening of the defence's 
availability to cases in which the victim is morally innocent of his or her provocative act. 
This move has however revealed various inconsistencies with the traditional common-
law requirements of the defence and with the current statutory provisions. To cure this, 
what is needed is a defence which partially excuses defendants and reflects the true 
reasons for why it does so. Various types of reform are thus discussed. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Provocation is a partial defence to murder. It will therefore prevent a conviction for 
murder even when all the physical and mental elements of the murder offence have been 
committed. This is on the basis that other independent factors have operated so as to 
reduce the actor' s blameworthiness. Hence in all cases, Provocation recognises the 
presence of an unlawful killing and malice aforethought. Yet it's essential claim is that 
the killing "has been provoked by words or conduct which are sufficient to deprive the 
ordinary person of self-control, and indeed do deprive the offender of self control, so that 
the offender has acted under this influence. "2 In these circumstances, the defendant is 
held to be not as culpable as the more deliberative, cold-blooded murderer. 
However, because the defence is partial, the defendant's liability is not totally absolved. 
Society will still look to punish acts committed in these circumstances and so a successful 
1 Matthew Goode "The Abolition of Provocation" in Stanley Yeo (ed.) Partial Excuses tolvfurder (The 
Federation Press, Sydney, 1992) 37, 46. 
2 above n I , 38. 
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defence will only mean that the offence is reduced from murder to manslaughter. The 
reason for this, and indeed the reason provocation is a defence only to murder, is that the 
defence originated from a time in which the offence was punished by the death penalty.
3 
This penalty was deemed too severe for provoked killings and thus an express defence 
emerged. Today, the death penalty no longer exists, yet there is still a need to mitigate the 
mandatory life sentence and thus distinguish hot-blooded killers from those in murder in 
cold blood. 
The current defence of provocation in New Zealand is contained in section 169 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 .4 This provides that murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the 
killing was done under provocation, and that: 
Anything done or said may be provocation if -
(a) In the circumstances of the case it was sufficient to deprive a 
person having the power of self-control of an ordinary person, 
but otherwise having the characteristics of the offender, of the 
power of self-control; and 
(b) It did in fact deprive the offender of the power of self control 
and thereby induced him to commit the act ofhomicide.
5 
Thus the three major elements of the defence are firstly, that the offender does lose self-
control; secondly, that there have been provocative behaviour; and thirdly, that this loss 
of control be enough to deprive an ordinary person with the accused ' s individualising 
characteristics, of the power of self-control. The question to ask is why do these elements 
permit the partial excusing of killers? What is the nature of Provocation that makes it a 
basis for lowering a defendant's culpability for murder? A good way of answering this 
question is to use the criminal law theory of 'justifications' and 'excuses'. 
3 Graeme Cross '"'God is a righteous judge. strong and patient; and God is provoked every day" . A Brief 
History of the Doctrine of Provocation in England" (1991) 13 SydLR 570, 601. 
4 Crimes Act 1961 , s 169. 
5 Crimes Act 1961, s 169(2). 
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II MATTERS OF JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE 
These phrases serve as theoretical rationales in the criminal law
. Classifying a defence as 
either 'justification' or 'excuse' is useful for working out th
e scope of a defence, its 
proper elements, and the conditions imposed on its availability
. 6 They can thus be helpful 
in explaining the basis of the Provocation defence and way i
n which it should operate. 
Firstly though, these rationales must be explained. 
'Justifications' are those defences which challenge the wro
ngfulness of an accused's 
normally unlawful act. They essentially say "I am responsib
le for what was done but 
should not be punished because what I did, although invading 
an interest of another, was 
done in circumstances which gave me a legal right to do it."
7 These circumstances which 
create a legal right will only arise in situations where the occu
rrence of the unlawful act 
has achieved some greater social good, or avoided some large
r social harm. 
8 Inherently 
then, unlawful acts which fulfil some greater social utility
 should not be punished 
because they are rightful, not wrongful, and any penalty is pla
inly incompatible with the 
social approval which should be bestowed on the actor.
9 Typical examples of this form of 
defence would be self-defence and law-enforcement immunitie
s. 
Excuses, on the other hand, are those defences which f
ocus on the actor. Like 
justifications, they recognise that a normally unlawful act has 
been committed, but unlike 
justifications, they maintain that in the circumstances the actor
 is someone whom it is not 
appropriate to punish. 
10 Often this is because some factor has operated which defeats t
he 
normal inference that the actor is responsible for his or her
 unlawful act.
11 A typical 
example of this form of defence is insanity. The presence of a
 mental disease will defeat 
the idea that the actor is responsible for his or her conduct. Pun
ishment in this situation is 
simply fruitless . 
6 G Fletcher Rethinking Criminal Lm11 (Little, Brown & Company L
td, Toronto, 1978) 810-813. 
7 P Alldridge "The Coherence of Defences'· [1983] Crim.L.R
. 665. 
8 Paul Robinson Criminal Lm11 Defenses Vol. 1 (West Publish
ing Company, Minnesota, 1984) 83 . 
9 Perka (1984) 14 CCC (3d) 386, 396 (SCC) per Dickson J. 
10 Perka above n 9, 397. 
11 Alldridge above n 7, 665. 
4 
For similar reasons, it can be seen why some unlawful acts 
committed under threat of 
harm are defended. For example, when a person has stolen f
ood under threat of death, 
that person is not punished with the offence of theft . This
 is because excuses often 
operate as 'concessions to human weakness' and defend actors
 who commit unlawful acts 
in circumstances where any ordinary person could have done
 the same. 
12 To punish in 
these circumstances merely reduces the law's credibility by
 pitching legal standards 
above what can be expected of normal human behaviour.
13 
Thus it can be seen that justification and excuse provide w
holly different bases for 
defending people's unlawful actions. The basic difference b
etween the two being that 
justifications claim the accused was a responsible actor yet 
the act was rightful, while 
under excuses, despite the act being wrongful the accused wa
s not a responsible actor.
14 
This distinction is important for several reasons. Firstly, i
f it is used to effectively 
separate and classify the appropriate criminal law defences 
under their headings, then 
people can be clearly appraised of the reasons for which 
their unlawful actions are 
exculpated. Essentially, this then helps determine the course
 of future behaviour.
15 If 
people know that a prohibited act may be justified in its ach
ievement of some greater 
social utility, then they will properly act in contravention of
 the law. Excuses however 
should not allow people to decide whether their normally illega
l act may be acceptable in 
a particular situation. 
16 The act is still wrongful and should therefore be avoided, y
et 
people can be later reassured that the law will show com
passion in deciding it is 
inappropriate to condemn this actor in the special circumstance
s. 
The second reason for insisting on such a distinction is o
ne of consistency. 
17 By 
categorising a defence as either justification or excuse, one sh
ould be able to determine 
the relevant factors which are required to be present in the rais
ing of a defence under that 
12 N Cameron "Defences and the Crimes Bill" in Cameron & Fr
ance (eds.) Essays on Criminal Law in New 
Zealand - Towards Ref orm? VUWLR Monograph 3, (VUW P
ress, 1990) 57, 59. 
13 S Yeo "Power of Self-Control in Provocation" (1992) 14 Syd
LR 3, 5. 
14 Alldridge above n 7, 666. 
15 E Colvin "Exculpatory Defences in Criminal Law" (1990) JO O
xford JnJ Legal Studies 381 , 385. 
16 Colvin above n 15, 385. 
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rationale. For example, justification defences seek to sh
ow that in certain circumstances, 
an illegal act is rightful. A defence following this ration
ale should therefore require these 
special circumstances to actually exist, or at least tha
t the accused have a reasonable 
belief that they exist.
18 If the act is committed in order to further some social utility, t
hen 
it is important that this is seen to be done. In theory, 
under an excuse basis this actual 
existence is irrelevant, as the true concern of such a def
ence is that the accused is acting 
in an intolerable situation. 
Additionally, any justification defence would have 
to reqmre that the defendant ' s 
response to the special circumstances be reasonable
. If the accused's response is 
unreasonable, then it cannot be said to serve as a social 
utility and thus a defence must be 
denied. Tied to this then is the need for proportionality
 in that response. If the accused' s 
act creates more harm than that which is avoided, t
hen once again, the concept of 
satisfying a social utility is not fulfilled . 
Excuses on the other hand are not engrossed with the co
ncept of an avoided harm and so 
a failure to satisfy the proportionality and reasonablene
ss requirements there should not 
rule out a defence. The relevant consideration is sim
ply that the defendant has been 
forced to act as he or she has. 
However, both concepts might be pertinent as evident
iary standards. If the defendant ' s 
response to the intolerable circumstances is highly un
reasonable and the harm caused 
highly disproportionate, then doubts are forced over wh
ether the defendant ' s acts were in 
fact caused by those circumstances or whether they ar
e in fact the result of some other 
influencing stimulus. This is consistent with the idea th
at although excuse defences may 
operate as concessions to human frailty, they do not pro
tect the frail human. The law has 
an important function in setting moral standards and
 so it requires actors to behave 
rationally, even in the face of intolerable circumstances
.19 Evidence of unreasonableness 
17 K Greenawalt "The Perplexing Borders ofJustification a
nd Excuse" (1984) 84 Colum L Rev 1896, 1900. 
18 Can1eron above n 12, 64. 
19 Cameron above n 12, 63 . 
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might thus show that the actor gave in to the circumstan
ces too easily and a defence will 
be denied. 
Where appropriate then, it is highly desirable for crimin
al law defences to adhere to this 
theoretical distinction. While clarity may thus be obtaine
d, reform will also be effectively 
guided and encouraged.
20 If a defence is seen to contain substantive requirements which
 
are inconsistent with its rationale, then these may be abo
lished in favour of more relevant 
considerations which are more in line with the defe
nce's theoretical basis. This is 
important when one comes to consider the problematic d
efence of provocation. 
Provocation 
It is therefore worth investigating just what the provoca
tion defence might look like if it 
was based on either of the two rationales. In particula
r, how one would then treat the 
central elements of the loss of self-control and the provo
cative conduct. Before doing so, 
it must be noted that in talking of Provocation, the 
terms 'partial ' justification and 
' partial ' excuse must be used. This is because one is not 
talking about a total exculpatory 
defence and thus the rationales can only be applied in p
art and not with the full impact 
that might be seen in other defences. 
For Provocation as a partial justification then, it would
 be important for the victim to 
have actually committed the provoking behaviour. Th
is would meet the requirement 
under justifications that the special circumstances must 
actually exist. Thus, it would not 
be sufficient for the defendant to have killed one person 
on provocation from another. 
Secondly, this provocative conduct must be such as to m
ake the ordinary person lose self-
control. In this way the defendant's response is reaso
nable. In assessing this, it will 
therefore be important that proportionality is seen in 
the defendant's response. If the 
mode of resentment does not bear a reasonable relation
ship to the provocation received, 
then the accused ' s act will not be justified. 
20 Colvin above n 15, 385 . 
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If on the other hand the defence is based on excuse, the defence will cover a much wider 
range of situations. None of the tight restrictions under justification theory will appl
y. It 
will only be necessary that the defendant show that he or she lost self-control to wha
t he 
or she honestly believed to be offensive conduct. If this is done then the actor cannot be 
held responsible for his or her act and a partial defence should be afforded them. 
This will not mean however that an accused will be defended if he or she loses 
self-
control to the slightest of offensive conduct. Excuses still require actors to beh
ave 
rationally even in the face of intolerable circumstances.
21 Thus if the loss of self control is 
a wildly unreasonable response to minor provocative conduct, then the defence may 
well 
be denied on the grounds that the offensive conduct was not seen to cause that los
s of 
self-control. Rather, the implication will be that the defendant's response was due m
ore 
to a wickedness of mind. Similarly, if the defendant's retaliation is so gre
atly 
disproportionate to the provocation received, then the same doubts over causation
 are 
cast. The difference from the justification defence is that these requirements serve onl
y as 
evidential factors and not as something which should rule out the defence altogether. 
The question that now must be posed is; which of these requirements has the doc
trine 
itself regarded as relevant for its application? Which rationale does the provoca
tion 
defence most resemble when determining an accused's liability? In general, the histor
y of 
the defence has at no time afforded a pure resemblance of either the rationale. A gra
dual 
shift from one rationale to the other can however be seen in the doctrine's journey f
rom 
early common-law days to its current application in the courts. 
ill IDSTORY OF THE DOCTRINE 
Provocation as a defence to murder had early beginnings. From as far back as
 the 
seventeenth century, the doctrine was used primarily as evidence for negating
 the 
21 Cameron above n 12, 63 . 
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implication of malice in murder.22 This showed that "the killing lay not in some secret 
hatred or design in the breast of the slayer but rather in provocation given by the deceased 
which inflamed the slayer' s passions."23 The test was thus subjective, assessing whether 
the accused had in fact lost self-control so as to eliminate the mental element.
24 
The situations in which these provoked killings could negate the presumption were laid 
out in Mawgridge25 . Here, Lord Holt stated that: (a) a striking of the accused, (b) angry 
words followed by assault, (c) the sight of a friend or relative being beaten, (d) the sight 
of a man being unlawfully deprived of his liberty, and (e) the sight of a man in adultery 
with the accused's wife, were situations which could constitute provocation. Other 
matters were expressly excluded from consideration. Thus words alone, trespass to 
property and misconduct by a child or servant was conduct insufficient to warrant 
provocation. 26 
A closer look at these inclusive and exclusive categories however shows they contain 
elements consistent only with justification-based theory. For example, in the inclusive 
categories, it can be observed that the provocative behaviour generally involves an actual 
assault or physical threat. It has been argued that this showed the willingness of the 
provoker to fight. 27 In these situations, it could thus be said that the defendant was to 
some extent justified in making a punitive return against someone who intentionally 
caused him serious offence. 28 
A second general observation of the inclusive categories is that the provoker's behaviour 
involves the unlawful breach of a legally protected right.
29 For example, adultery, 
regarded as a serious criminal offence in the seventeenth century, is listed as the fifth 
category for possible provocation. However, it may be noticed that an act of 
22 Garth Stanish "Whither Provocation?" (1993) 7(2) Auck U LR 381, 382. 
23 Andrew Ashworth "The Doctrine of Provocation" [1976) 35(2) CLJ 292. 
24 Stanish above n 22, 383. 
25 Mawgridge (1707) Kel. 119 per Holt CJ in Stanish above n 22, 383. 
26 Mawgridge above n 25, 130. 
27 Ashworth above n 23, 293 . 
28 Ashworth above n 23, 307. 
29 Alldridge above n 7, 669. 
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unfaithfulness by one's lover is not included. This is because although appearing to be a 
similarly offensive act, it could not constitute provocation because it was not unlawful. 
30 
Hence, only in situations where the victim behaved illegally could he or she be said to 
have forfeited their right to full protection under the law. 
31 It would appear then that 
consistent with justification-based theory, society's interest in protecting people from 
fatal conduct will be less intense when the victim's own illegal conduct has contributed to 
the act of violence. The essential question, as Lord Holt's categories seem to suggest, is 
"in what way has the victim 'asked for it'?"
32 
The excluded categories, on the other hand, reflect matters which were insufficient or 
'too trivial' to arouse passions. In these cases it would be simply unacceptable for 
someone to lose their self-control. As Finbarr McAuley states, this principle of triviality 
implies a theory of partial justification. 
33 
As the years passed however, the whole idea of negativing the implication of malice was 
soon abandoned. It simply failed to answer the criticisms of why the accused was not 
fully acquitted nor why in most cases there appeared to be a clear intention to kill.
34 Yet 
to take the step of converting previously justified behaviour into that warranting capital 
punishment was too dramatic. Instead, Provocation became a partial defence to murder 
once it had been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had killed another with 
the sufficient mental state for murder. 
35 
Similarly, the idea of having acceptable categories of provocation also fell into disfavour. 
These categories were instead replaced by the requirement that the provocation be 
"something which might naturally cause an ordinary and reasonable-minded person to 
30 Alldridge above n 7, 669. 
31 Jacob Dressler "Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?" (1988) 51(4) MLR 467, 4
77. 
32 J Horder "The Problem of Provocative Children" [1987) Crim.L.R. 655, 657. 
33 Finbarr McAuley "Provocation: Partial Justification not Partial Excuse" in S Yeo (ed.) Partial Exc
uses to 
Murder (The Federation Press, Sydney, 1992) 19, 26. 
34 Goode above n 1, 40. 
35 Goode above n I , 40. 
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lose his self-control."36 Thus an objective test, initially used to measure the truth of the 
defendant's claim for loss of control, was crystallised into a rule oflaw.
37 
This reasonableness requirement was codified in New Zealand's first statutory form of 
the provocation defence. Section 165 of the Criminal Code 1893 provided that murder in 
the heat of passion may be reduced to manslaughter if that passion was caused by a 
"wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive the ordinary person 
of the power of self-control". This explicit element of section 165 continued to thus 
support the concept of Provocation as a partial justification. 
Back at common law, the case of Simpson
38 reinforced the idea that the defence was 
dependent on the victim forfeiting his rights to full protection under the law. Here, a 
young husband returned home to find his wife admitting to numerous infidelities and to 
abandoning their handicapped child. Completely distraught, the husband chose to end his 
child's suffering. In convicting the husba.nd of murder, the court stated that while a 
defence may have been available if it had been the wife who was killed, there was none 
when the victim was the child. Thus, in accordance with justification theory, it was 
important that resentment toward p~ovocative conduct be directed at the provoker. 
Also consistent with this, the requirement of proportionality expressly became part of the 
legal test. In Mancini, Viscount Simon expressed that the inquiry was whether the 
provocation was such as to lead the reasonable man to lose self-control, and in applying 
this test, the court must take into account the mode of resentment with which the 
homicide was effected.39 If this mode did not bear a reasonable relationship to the 
provocation then the inference could not be drawn that a reasonable man would have 
done likewise. 
36 R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox CC 336 in Stanish above n 22, 383. 
37 Stanish above n 22, 383. 
38 R v Simpson (1915) 11 Cr App R 218 in Cross above n 3,585. 
39 Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions [1942] AC 1, 9 (HL). [Mancini] 
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All in all, it could thus be observed that the provocation defence possessed much which 
was consistent only with a justification-based defence. A consequence of this however 
was that the defence was strict in its application and hence might be refused to deserving 
defendant's whose case did not meet the objective criteria. This problem was illustrated 
in Bedder.40 
Here, the sexually impotent defendant was mocked by a prostitute whom he had 
attempted to have intercourse with. The prostitute then assaulted the defendant, who 
responded by stabbing her to death. In assessing the reaction of a reasonable man, 
counsel for the defendant stated that the reasonable man must be imbued with the 
defendant's physical peculiarity - his impotence. Lord Simonds disagreed. He stated that 
if the reasonable man were imbued with the physical peculiarities of the defendant, then 
it "makes nonsense" of the reasonable man test.
41 The defence of provocation was thus 
denied. 
The Move to a More Excuse-Based Defence 
The problem was apparent . Defendant's who had been severely offended and so lost their 
self-control were not allowed a defence simply because the reasonable man, absent of the 
insulted peculiarity, would not have reacted to the same offensive actions. The legislature 
saw this as an undesirable outcome. They therefore enacted section 3 of the Homicide 
Act 1957 which made the jury the sole arbiters in determining how the reasonable person 
would respond.42 New Zealand went one step further. Its legislature enacted section 169 
of the Crimes Act 1961 which required the ordinary person to possess the individualising 
characteristics of the accused. 43 The result was a 'hybrid' person containing a mixture of 
objective and subjective elements. 
40 Bedder v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] 2 All ER 801 (HL). [Bedder] 
41 Bedder above n 40, 803 per Lord Simonds LC. 
42 Homicide Act 1957, s 3. 
43 above n 5. 
12 
The first case to apply this test was R v McGregor. 
44 Here, although there was no 
evidence of provocation and thus a decision on the trial court's direction unnecessary, the 
Court of Appeal nonetheless provided guidance for the lower courts in interpreting and 
applying section 169. North J talked of section 169(2) as containing both a subjective and 
objective test, and thus involved the "fusion of.. . two discordant notions. "
45 To prevent 
then the objective 'ordinary person' test from being wholly extinguished, he stated that 
the possible subjective characteristics of a defendant should be limited. The characteristic 
therefore had to have a "sufficient degree of permanence" to warrant inclusion in the 
defendant's personality.
46 However they could be mental or physical qualities and could 
also involve other attributes such as colour, race or creed. Importantly though, these had 
to be of "sufficient significance" to make the defendant different from the ordinary 
person. 47
 A further limitation was that there had to be a real connection between the 
provocation and the characteristic to warrant departure from the strict ordinary person 
test. 
Thus although in a limited form, the provocation defence was beginning to consider 
individualising aspects of the accused. These added considerations are consistent with 
excuse-based forms of thinking. The more idiosyncrasies of the accused that are 
considered, the more society might be able to understand the unjustified act of rage.
48 
The English courts waited several years before clearly affirming once and for all a test 
which appreciated a defendant's individualising characteristics. In Camp/in, a fifteen-
year-old boy was sexually assaulted by an older male and then laughed at.
49 The boy then 
lost control and split the deceased 's skull with a chapati pan. On the strict reasonable 
person test, the trial court held that these were not the actions of an ordinary man to such 
provocation. Lord Diplock in the House of Lords however held that the test was whether 
a reasonable person of the accused ' s age and sex would have lost control to such 
44 R v McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069 (CA). 
45 R v McGregor above n 44, 1081 per North J. 
46 R v McGregor above n 44, 1081 per North J. 
41 R v McGregor above n 44, 1081 per North J. 
48 Dressler above n 31 , 475. 
49 Director of Public Prosecutions v Camp/in [1978] AC 705 (HL) [Camp/in] 
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provocation. 50 Hence the characteristics of the accused went to making the provocative 
conduct seem worse than it would be for the ordinary person. 
Back in New Zealand, the requirements laid out in McGregor were being met with some 
difficulty. In R v Taaka the defendant awoke after a night's drinking to find his cousin in 
bed with his wife.51 Suspecting his cousin had raped his wife, the deceased was deeply 
angered. A fortnight later, when getting into a fight with his cousin, the defendant drove 
home, got his gun and returned to shoot his provoker. Counsel for the defendant claimed 
that he was suffering from an obsessive-compulsive disorder such that he would brood 
and feel resentment for much longer than the ordinary person. This was accepted by the 
court as a characteristic, thus disregarding the McGregor restriction that the characteristic 
be directly linked to the provocation. 
52 
Doubts on the McGregor direction were firmly addressed in McCarthy. 
53 
The court here 
made it clear that there need be no link between the characteristic and the provocation. 
54 
In light of mental characteristics which seemed to affect all aspects of the defendant's 
personality, as in Taaka, this requirement just caused problems. Similarly, the test now 
came in line with Camp/in in that the characteristics made the provocation seem worse 
rather than lower the standard of self-control from that of the reasonable person. 
Thus following McCarthy, the possible characteristics have been widely expanded. This 
has represented a growing trend to individualise the defence and thus make it more in line 
with excuse theory of criminal law. Less and less is the question whether the victim asked 
for it through their wrongful act, but more and more whether the defendant has lost self-
control and so should not be fully blamed for his actions. 
55 The idea being that the actor 
should suffer less punishment for his or her impulsive act than others who commit more 
5° Camp/in above n 49, 717 per Lord Diplock 
51 R v Taaka [1982] 2 NZLR 198 (CA). 
52 R v Taaka above n 51 , 201. 
53 R v McCarthy [1992] 2 NZLR 550 (CA). 
54 R v McCarthy above n 53, 558 per Cooke P. 
55 Ashworth above n 23, 314. 
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deliberate offences. No more can this be seen than in the recent trend of c
ase-law which 
involves victims who are morally irresponsible for their offensive act. 
IV THE MORALLY INNOCENT VICTIM 
R v Campbelf
6 
In this case, the defendant had been invited into the deceased's house for a
 cup of coffee. 
Whilst having the coffee, the deceased touched the defendant's thigh and 
smiled at him. 
At that point the defendant experienced a flashback to his sexually abused
 past where his 
abuser had done the same thing. He lost control, hitting the deceased 
with a poker, 
punching him and then striking him with an axe. On the following charg
e of murder, a 
plea of provocation was allowed. The jury found that a reasonable p
erson with the 
defendant's history of abuse and experience of the sudden flashback could
 have done the 
same in identical circumstances. 
The important point for this discussion is the victim's conduct. If merely 
placing a hand 
on someone's knee can constitute provocation, then the defence has clearl
y shifted away 
from its historical roots. In no way is this action unlawful or conduct in w
hich the victim 
was inciting violence such that he 'asked for it'. Indeed, it shows that "the 
victim may not 
comprehend their actions at all". 
57 The emphasis now is clearly not on the gravity of the 
provocative conduct but on the accused's absence of self-control. Thus 
the shift away 
from a justification basis and towards the excuse rationale is ever more app
arent. 
The same observation is made in recent cases involving mentally handica
pped and child 
victims. The point is more obvious though in that not only do these victims
 hold no moral 
responsibility for their actions, but they are in fact 'incapable' of doing so
. Children, for 
example, by nature "lack the ability to evaluate the impact of their ow
n conduct."
58 
56 R v Campbell [1997) l NZLR 16 (CA). 
57 C. Clarkson & H.Keating Criminal Law: Text and Materials (3 ed, Sweet & Max,vell
, London, 1994) 
648. 
58 L Kronma.n "Moral Reasoning" (1983) 92 Yale LJ 763, 789. 
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Indeed, the younger a child is, the more it lacks moral imagination and the ability to 
assess the moral significance of the things it does.
59 Thus the only basis for granting a 
defence in these cases is on the idea that since the defendant has lost self-control, the law 
should show compassion as the defendant ' s actions are not truly his or her own. The 
situation is illustrated firstly in Doughty. 
60 
RvDoughty 
Here, a young father allegedly lost control when overborne by the persistent crying of his 
17-day-old son. He therefore tried covering the boy' s head with cushions and 
subsequently knelt on them in an effort to quieten the child. Unfortunately, this led to the 
suffocation of the infant and a consequent charge of murder. In the Court of Appeal, it 
was held that since it had been accepted by both parties that the persistent crying of the 
child could be causally linked to the defendant ' s loss of self-control, then this satisfied 
section 3 of the Homicide Act. 
61 Thus the defendant should have been entitled to have a 
defence of provocation heard before a jury. Since this right had been denied to the 
defendant in the lower court, a verdict of manslaughter was thus substituted for the 
mandatory murder sentence previously imposed. 
The most recent New Zealand provocation case highlights the issue in relation to the 
mentally handicapped. 
R v Albury Thomson
62 
This case involved a mother' s intentional killing of her daughter. The daughter, Casey, 
was an autistic child who very difficult to raise. She constantly displayed sexually 
inappropriate behaviour, ripped her bedding and chanted repetitively. The accused, her 
mother, was herself particularly susceptible to stress and had an unreal expectation that 
59 ibid p791 
60 R v Doughty (1986) 83 Cr.App.R. 319. (CA) 
61 R v Doughty above n 60, 326 per Stocker LJ. 
62 R vA /bury-Thomson (1998) 16 CRNZ 79 (CA). 
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her daughter would get better. When Casey was turned away from
 five different health 
and social support facilities, the mother was forced to take Casey int
o the family home to 
look after her. This was a very exhausting time for the accused, burd
ened with the care of 
such a difficult child. One psychiatric report stated that the family
 "had been stressed 
beyond human endurance".
63 Many times in fact, Janine Albury-Thomson had thought 
prison was better than the life she was living. 
On the fatal night itself, Casey had been chanting ceaselessly. Whe
n told to stop by her 
mother, Casey just laughed. The accused then asked Casey to get dre
ssed, after which the 
pair drove out to the Oroua River Bridge. After failing to get Casey
 to jump, the accused 
returned home, got her dressing gown cord and strangled her da
ughter. The accused 
confessed this in itself was a difficult affair and took up to five minu
tes. 
On a charge of murder before the High Court, Janine Albur
y-Thomson pleaded 
Provocation. She claimed that her particular susceptibility to st
ress, plus an unreal 
expectation that her daughter' s autism would get better, had made it 
more than difficult to 
maintain her self control. Consequently, when she was laughed at on
 the fatal night itself, 
the mother claimed she "just snapped"
64
. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of 
manslaughter by reason of provocation. 
Clearly, the defence has turned away from the historical justificatio
n-based rationale. In 
these cases it is simply inhumane to claim that an act of retaliation 
against the "perfectly 
natural episodes or events of crying and restlessness" of a chil
d could be partially 
justified.6
5 Thus it is similarly inhumane to claim that a mentally handicappe
d person 
could forfeit their full protection under the law by doing acts w
hich inflame others 
passions. As illustrated in Campbell, the defence is really more abou
t partially excusing 
actors who have understandably lost their grip on self-control. 
63 R vAlbury-Thomson above n 62, 83 . 
64 R v Albury-Thomson above n 62, 85. 
65 R v Doughty above n 60, 326 per Caulfield J. 
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Many commentators regard this as a desirable outcome.
66 One commentator in particular 
has argued that the approach is laudable as the provocation defen
ce is really about a 
person who could not control themselves.
67 Thus in the defence of duress, a defendant 
will often be shown sympathy when acceding to a threat even thou
gh he or she always 
has the opportunity to refuse. This is primarily because the defe
ndant lacked a fair 
opportunity to conform to the law. Thus in the case of provocation, 
the defence is really 
about partially excusing an actor because on being provoked, that 
person is much less 
able to conform to the law that the ordinary unprovoked individual. 
V PROBLEMS WITH THE MORALLY INNOCENT VICTIM 
J. Popular Conceptions 
While the move toward an excuse-basis might thus be applaude
d by some, several 
problems consequently anse which require contemplation. One 
problem is that the 
Provocation does not then accord with society's conception 
of the defence as 
justification-based. Public outrage might thus, and does, ensue when
 someone is partially 
defended for retaliating against irritant and persistent crying, 
mentally disturbed 
behaviour, or the touch of someone's thigh. Paul Robinson also rai
ses this concern. He 
states "only a person who is aware of the evidence at trial will unders
tand that acquittal is 
based upon those special characteristics of the actor, not on the app
roval or tolerance of 
the act."68 Applying the defence of provocation to cases of the mor
ally innocent victim 
then may lower the law's credibility by appearing to vindicate acts w
hich are abhorrent in 
society' s eyes. 
2. Reasonable Self-Control 
66 See S Yeo Compulsion in the Criminal Law (The Law Book Compan
y Ltd, Sydney, 1990) 43, and J 
Smith & D Hogan Criminal Law (3 ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1962) 354.
 
67 Dressler above n 31 , 480. 
68 Robinson, above n 8, 125. 
18 
Additionally, if the provocation defence is to be excuse
-based and allow cases involving 
morally innocent victims, then there is a problem in insi
sting on a test of reasonable self-
control. This is because in these cases, the individualis
ing characteristics of the accused 
often "overarch all aspects of the accused's personalit
y". 69 Hence "any action" by the 
victim would seem to be able to constitute provocation.
70 In these morally innocent cases, 
the defendants claim depression, stress and histories of
 abuse as characteristics and these 
make it difficult for juries to then also consider the ordin
ary person's level of self-control. 
As one commentator has pointed out, the acceptance
 of characteristics such as these 
"erode public confidence in the administration of the ex
isting defence of provocation. "
71 
If Provocation is to operate as an excuse-based defen
ce, then it should abandon this 
objective requirement. 
3. Proportionality 
Also, if the defence does show sympathy where the mor
ally innocent are killed, then it is 
clear that the proportionality requirement is inappropria
te. This idea that the defendant's 
act should not cause more harm than is avoided has alw
ays had a "loose meaning" in the 
law of provocation.
72 This is simply because it is difficult to claim that there is
 proportion 
in B's punching of A and A's killing B. The claim h
owever is that the proportion is 
greater if A' s killing B was a result of B committing ad
ultery with A' s wife. In the cases 
of the morally incapable victim, this same degree of co
mparison cannot be made. In no 
way is the retaliation reasonable considering the fact t
hat the victim is unaware of the 
impact of his or her own conduct. 
4. Statutory Inconsistencies 
Further problems arise in New Zealand's statutory fo
rmulation of the defence. If the 
defence does allow provocative conduct to come from 
morally innocent parties and thus 
69 Stanish above n 22, 392. 
70 Stanish above n 22, 392. 
71 Stanish above n 22, 393. 
72 Ashworth, above n 23, 295. 
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be a defence based heavily on excuse, then subsection (5) 
of the defence needs to be 
reconsidered. This subsection provides that ' 'No one shall be
 held to give provocation to 
another by lawfully exercising any power conferred by la
w" .73 The inconsistency is 
obvious. If the defence is to focus on the actor' s loss of self-co
ntrol then there is no 
reason why the law should not show sympathy to those wh
o show resentment to their 
being restrained for arrest while under the influence of a loss 
of self-control. 
Hence there is also no reason for subsection ( 6) to require tha
t the provocation must be 
given by the person killed. 
74 Under excuse theory, the defence should allow situations 
where the defendant loses control upon provocation from X, 
yet intentionally kills Y who 
has tried to restrain the defendant. Excuses give concession
s to those who acts are not 
truly their own. If an ordinary person is provoked to lose his
 or her self-control then it is 
unlikely that they could have the capacity to stop an attack
 if another person sought to 
restrain them. Thus a defence should be allowed, a result 
which would be "eminently 
just". 75 
5. Time for cooling 
Another problem particular to cases such as Doughty and A
lbury-Thomson is that they 
show the inappropriateness of the requirement that there not
 be ' time for the passion to 
cool ' . Traditionally, the suddenness of the defendant's ret
aliation following upon the 
provocation was an important indication that the defendant 
had in fact lost self-control. 
Thus retaliation committed after there was ' time to cool ' inf
erred that the defendant had 
not acted impulsively but merely with a desire to take vengea
nce.76
 
In cases such as Doughty and Albury-Thomson, there was a
mple time for passions to 
cool. For example, following the point at which she ' snappe
d', Janine Albury-Thomson 
drove her daughter around town, trying to decide whether
 or not to actually kill her 
daughter. The allowance of a defence in this case shows
 that ' cooling time', while 
73 Crimes Act 1961, s 169(5). 
74 Crimes Act 1961, s 169( 6). 
75 Dressler above n 31, 476. 
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important in classic provocation cases, may not always be an appropr
iate test for pointing 
to deserving defendants. This will always be so when the provocati
on has involved the 
build-up of stress and the sense of hopelessness at living in intolerabl
e circumstances. 
One author has argued that this is because these situations are not cle
ar provocation cases 
but are instead what can be called 'despair ' killings.
77 These occur where an accused has 
killed through frustration, anger or despair in response to an excep
tional situation, and 
where his or her final act cannot be said to have been characterist
ic of a loss of self-
control. Consequently, 'despair' cannot be described as a sudden em
otion like anger or 
fear but is in fact an abnormal, emotional state of mind brought abou
t by more prolonged 
ill-treatment or wrongdoing. Any reaction out of 'despair ' is t
hus not sudden or 
spontaneous but is more often seen as calm and deliberate. 
Both Albury-Thomson and Doughty therefore fit neatly into this categ
ory of behaviour. 
Indeed, a psychiatric report issued at Janine Albury-Thomson' s trial
 stated "At the time 
of the offence the appellant was suffering from a mixture of 
anxiety, depression, 
frustration and anger .. . such that she felt at the end of her tether and t
hat she had to put an 
end to the suffering of her daughter and her own distress."
78 Thus Janine ' s calm and 
deliberate act of driving Casey around town before deciding on the
 ultimate method of 
her murder is consistent with this ' despair' reaction and not the ' sud
den' loss of control 
associated with provocation. 
The analogy can of course be drawn with Battered Women' s Synd
rome (BWS) cases. 
These situations similarly do not fit well within the provocation defe
nce. Typically, they 
involve prolonged series of vicious abuse and threats at the hands of
 a male partner. The 
women ' s lives thus become a living hell such that they will do the o
nly thing they see as 
76 Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932 (CourtCriminalAppeal). 
77 Jeremy Horder Provocation and Responsibility (Clarenson Press, Oxf
ord, 1992) 191. 
78 R v Albury-Thomson above n 62, 85. 
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possible to escape it. Thus the act of killing often comes th
rough a degree of 
premeditation, being more calm and deliberate than the typical provo
cation case. 
79 
The important point is that like BWS cases, despair situations s
uch as Doughty and 
Albury-Thomson have widened the scope of a provocation defence
 beyond anything it 
could ever have envisaged covering. The problems they cause cle
arly show that their 
situations are not meant to be dealt with by a defence meant for 
enraged killers. The 
question is, do these offenders deserve a defence at all? 
VI THE NEED FOR A DEFENCE 
Yes, killers such as Janine Albury-Thomson do need a criminal
 defence. The law' s 
credibility must be maintained by not placing its standards above wh
at can be expected of 
normal human behaviour. Through excuse theories of law, this cred
ibility is maintained 
when people are not punished for their illegal acts because they ar
e committed in such 
intolerable circumstances that the normal standards of the law canno
t be applied to them. 
Sympathy should be shown to these offenders, especially when so
ciety has left a very 
limited choice of alternatives. In the Albury-Thomson example, seve
re autism has been 
described as a health condition which is "nobody' s child" and which
 tends to fall through 
a gap in the health system. 
80 The accused herself was turned away from eight different 
health or welfare agencies and it was really "inconceivable that so
ciety could expect a 
family to take care of such a severe and uncontrolled psychiatric
 patient within their 
home environment."
81 Although this does not mean the law should become a cure for 
social ills, these factors do show the limited choices available to 
defendants and thus 
indicate where others could act similarly. In the Albury-Thomson c
ase for example, it is 
clear that the court decided that the circumstances involved were e
xceptional and even 
the most controlled individual could have acted drastically. 
82 
79 See for one example Ahluwah/ia (1992) 4 All ER 889 (CA) where the
 appellant deliberately set fire to 
the deceased's bedroom while he slept. 
80 "Loving mwn' s desperate remedy" The New Zealand Herald, Auckla
nd, New Zealand, 17 July 1998, 
A:9. 
81 R v Albury-Thomson above n 62, 83. 
82 R v A /bury-Thomson above n 62, 83. 
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There should not however be a total defence. Joshua Dressle
r, in attempting to explain 
how the provocation defence operates, uses the comparison o
f duress. 
83 In this situation, 
defendants are excused because the threat of harm does
 not leave them realistic 
opportunity to conform to the law. However, a defence will n
ot be available if the action 
under duress involves killing someone. In this situation the law
 requires people to be 
heroes and sacrifice themselves before violating the highest 
protected right in society -
the sanctity of life. Thus for Albury-Thomson, even though w
e can sympathise with her 
plight in a despairing situation, it cannot overrun the value 
that society places on life 
itself Clearly, Albury-Thomson deserves to be distinguishe
d from other cold-hearted 
revengeful killers, yet her act is still one which is worthy 
of society's condemnation, 
whatever her circumstances. 
However, these concessions should not be offered under
 the provocation defence. 
Ashworth states that the typical paradigm of provocation i
s that it deals with moral 
wrongs by both parties. 
84 In the cases of the morally incapable, how can it ever be said 
that a mentally handicapped person has committed a moral 
wrong? He also comments 
that the defence is meant to deal with ' normal ' victims in tha
t it has always operated to 
cover situations where people have been provoked by others
 who intend the harm they 
inflict. 8
5 Jacob Dressler talks of using "clean tools". 
86 No more is this necessary than for 
a defence which has been stretched beyond convenience in its 
attempts to show sympathy 
to those who do not fall within its reach. What killers such 
as Janine Albury-Thomson 
need a is defence expressly tailored to reflect the reasons for w
hich they are excused. 
VII OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
83 Dressler above n 31, 472. 
84 Ashworth above n 23, 307. 
85 Ashworth above n 23, 307. 
86 Jacob Dressler "Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Sea
rch of a Ratioanle" ( 1982) 73 J Crim L & 
Criminology 421 , 425 . 
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1. A Discretionary Sentence for Murder 
One method is of course to abolish the mandatory life sentence for murder. Any evidence 
of provocation or extreme circumstances can then simply be taken as reasons to mitigate 
the full murder sentence. Obviously, the complexity of s 169 can then be completely 
disposed of Indeed, this was the proposal of the New Zealand Crimes Bill 1989
87 which 
essentially repeated ideas put forth earlier by the 1976 Criminal Law Reform 
Committee 88. 
The Bill's reasons for abolishing the provocation doctrine were simply that the defence 
was hedged round with too much difficulty and technicality.
89 It was thought also though 
that the doctrine was thought to have only originated in earlier times through a need for 
offenders to sometimes avoid the rigour of a death penalty. 
90 As McAuley states, perhaps 
the defence emerged "after judges were trying to fashion a discriminating filter for cases 
of intentional killing which were thought ... to be insufficiently heinous to warrant a 
capital sentence". 
9 1 Since the death penalty no longer exists, the Bill, and indeed the 
Crimes Consultative Committee report on the Bill, recommended that the doctrine be 
only relevant to sentence and not conviction.
92 
However, it is submitted that both the decisions to adopt a discretionary sentence and to 
abolish the doctrine be avoided. The New South Wales Law Commission recently 
considered this very issue and strongly recommended that the provocation doctrine be 
retained as a matter for conviction. 
93 The reason for this was to maintain the involvement 
of the community by way of the jury, in the decision-making process.
94 It is through the 
jury and not the judge that decisions as to levels of culpability need to be made, and 
conclusions drawn on whether or not the offender is to avoid the stigma of 'murderer'. 
87 Crimes Bill 1989 Clause 128 
88 New Zealand Criminal Law Reform Committee Report on Culpable Homicide (Wellington, 1976)
 
89 Crimes Bill 1989 - Report of the Crin1es Consultative Committee (Wellington, 1991) 46. 
90 above 11 89, 46. 
91 McAuley above 11 33, 25 . 
92 above 11 89, 46. 
93 NSW Law Refonn Commission Report 83 - Partial Defences to Nlurder: Provocation and Infant
icide 
(Sydney, 1993) 54. 
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Lord Cooke supported this view in his personal response to the Crimes Bill 1989.
95 
He 
stated that it is up to the jury to condemn crimes and hints that it is only the jury, as an 
alleged cross-representation of society, who can adequately judge how the ordinary 
person might have reacted.
96 
Consequently then, the doctrine must be retained in its current statutory form. Society has 
yet to decide through Parliament that a loss of self-control will not constitute adequate 
ground for reducing blame. Thus in the public' s view, there is still a difference between 
the even-tempered, deliberate killer and the hot-blooded, impulsive one. The provocation 
defence then should enable the law to label the two as dissimilar by allowing the 
impulsive killer to be convicted of manslaughter. 
Whether this traditional form of thinking currently holds is uncertain. There are signs that 
things may be changing. The NSW Law Commission stated that contemporary 
conceptions of civilised society do not approve of excusing personal acts of retaliation.
97 
One author has commented that it is okay to feel anger but another to express it.
98 
He 
states that there are other outlets for outrage, other ways of expressing resentment, and 
therefore it must no longer be thought that the feeling and expressing of emotions are 
inevitably intertwined. 
Whatever the outcome, the need for a defence which adequately caters for ' despair' 
situations is paramount. The provocation doctrine itself presently boasts a seemingly 
infinite flexibility in dealing with these but this has been at the expense of simplicity and 
sureness over the defence's rationale. What is needed is a defence which excuses killers 
because of their extreme situation and in fact indicates that this is the reason that their 
94 above n 93, 55. 
95 R Cooke "The Crimes Bill 1989: A judge's response" [1989] NZLJ 235. 
96 Cooke, above n 95, 239. 
97 above n 93 , 56. 
98 Horder above n 77, 197. 
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culpability is reduced. Only then will integrity and public confidence m verdicts be 
achieved.
99 
2. Degrees of Murder 
One way of achieving this is to adopt the structure proposed under the current 'Degree's 
Of Murder Bill' . 100 This Bill, currently before Parliament, proposes that there be three 
degrees of murder. The first degree would cover malicious or sadistic killings and would 
carry a minimum sentence of 25 years. The second degree of murder would mirror New 
Zealand's current murder offence and thus cover less malicious but still heinous murders. 
Third degree murder would be reserved for those killings committed under provocation 
or diminished responsibility and would provide judges with a wide discretion for 
sentencing. 
A finding of third degree murder by way of provocation would still require the jury to 
make a finding based on section 169. However this does provide an effective way of 
allowing juror involvement whilst giving the judge the power to determine an appropriate 
sentence for each deserving case. Thus this structure has much to commend it. However 
current problems raised by some commentators on the definition of first-degree murders 
and the large power given to the jury may well mean the structure does not come to 
fruition .101 The impressive aspect of the Bill is that it considers a defence of diminished 
responsibility, something which is long overdue in New Zealand. 
3. Diminished Responsibility 
In England and Wales, this partial defence generally applies where the accused has killed 
while suffering an 'abnormality of the mind' such that mental responsibility for the act 
99 J Ablett-Kerr "A licence to kill or an overdue reform?: the case of diminished responsibility" (1997) 9(1) 
OtagoLR 1, 18. 
100 Degrees of Murder Bill 1996. 
101 S McAnally "The Penalty for Murder" [1998] NZLJ 420. 
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has been impaired.102 Clearly, this defence has an overlap with provocation m its 
consideration of mental deficiencies. However the difference is that diminished 
responsibility does not require a loss of self control, nor a comparison with the reasonable 
person. 
The New Zealand courts have shown a clear intention to mould the provocation doctrine 
into a form of diminished responsibility. Cooke P explained in McCarthy that the added 
observations in McGregor had unduly restricted the ambit of provocation.
103 
He added 
that this appeared "to have been influenced by the view that diminished responsibility 
had not yet been accepted by the New Zealand Parliament; yet within a limited field this 
may be seen as the inevitable and deliberate effect of the statutory changes embodied in s 
169 of the Crimes Act."104
 Clearly, the acceptance of a growing number of mental 
characteristics under the defence has seen the doctrine merge closely to that of 
diminished responsibility. Yet as Brookbanks notes, "it should not be permitted to evolve 
by a process of extension of existing defences without an accompanying careful 
consideration of its theoretical considerations. "
105 
Hence, despair situations would not be disqualified and could possibly be accommodated 
under a ' severe depression' abnormality. The problem of course is with classification. If 
the accused does not exhibit clear signs of an abnormality then the defence may be 
denied to him or her. 
4. Model Penal Code 
Overall, the best option is to adopt a wider manslaughter offence, something akin to the 
American Model Penal Code10
6
. This provides that murder may be reduced to 
manslaughter if it "is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
102 Homicide Act 1957 section 2. 
103 R v McCarthy above n 53 , 558 per Cooke P. 
104 R v AJcCarthy above n 53, 558. 
105 W Brookbanks "Provocation - Defining the Limits of Characteristics" (1986) 10 Crim LJ 411 , 418. 
106 A merican law Institute - Model Penal Code and Commentaries Part II 55. 
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disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse"
107
. As the Code goes on 
to explain, this reasonable explanation is to be determined from the circumstances as the 
defendant believed them to be. 
A classification of this type would clearly have enough flexibility to include a range of 
killers who deserve to be partially excused. The problematic defence of provocation and 
that of diminished responsibility could be effectively moulded under one head. 
Importantly, killers such as Doughty and Janine Albury-Thomson could be relieved of a 
charge of murder because of the extreme emotional disturbance at being presented with 
harmful circumstances outside of their control. In fact, a range of factors could be 
considered, much like the call for mitigating circumstances to be reserved for the judge' s 
sentencing. In this form however, the jury can have an input by applying these factors to 
conviction . 
By excusing the accused for emotional disturbance, the law sends the correct message 
and partially exculpates in a deserving situation. Really, the question which this form of 
manslaughter asks is; can the actor' s loss of self-control be understood in terms which 
arouse sympathy enough to call for mitigation in the sentence.
108 It is arguable that this is 
really the type of question which the jury already applies. Faced with inadequate legal 
defences in a situation which calls for concessions, the jury will take the simple option of 
calling murder, manslaughter. A defence of this type would provide a legally accepted 
means of doing so. 
VIlI CONCLUSION 
Overall, a suitable defence for 'despair' type situations is clearly needed. The move from 
a justification rationale to one of excuse has demonstrated the ability for these cases to be 
dealt with under the current provocation defence. Unfortunately this has meant 
undermining traditional requirements of the defence and illustrating various 
107 above n 106, 55. 
108 above n 106, 57. 
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inconsistencies m its statutory formulation . The biggest impact however as been the 
weakening of the law' s credibility by having a defence which appears to operate contrary 
to popular conceptions. Under the current provocation defence, confusion is to be 
expected when 17-day-old babies and mentally handicapped adolescents can be held to 
have provoked their own demise. What is needed is a separate defence like diminished 
responsibility, or even better the Model Penal Code, which is designed to give 
concessions to deserving defendants in a way that effectively tells society the reasons 
why. The defence of provocation can then continue to operate in a way which leaves its 
scope, requirements and rationale undisturbed. 
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